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Abstract
Due to several socio-political factors, to many psychiatrists only a strictly objective definition of mental disorder,
free of value components, seems really acceptable. In this paper, I will explore a variant of such an objectivist
approach to defining metal disorder, natural function objectivism. Proponents of this approach make recourse to
the notion of natural function in order to reach a value-free definition of mental disorder. The exploration of
Christopher Boorse’s ‘biostatistical’ account of natural function (1) will be followed an investigation of the ‘hybrid
naturalism’ approach to natural functions by Jerome Wakefield (2). In the third part, I will explore two proposals
that call into question the whole attempt to define mental disorder (3). I will conclude that while ‘natural function
objectivism’ accounts fail to provide the backdrop for a reliable definition of mental disorder, there is no
compelling reason to conclude that a definition cannot be achieved.
Introduction
As an important element in the ongoing efforts to
develop the DSM-V, researchers have again scrutinised
the concept of mental disorder and accentuate that his
is both a crucial field and one that needs additional
work [1,2]. This is no surprise. The concept of mental
disorder is at the foundation of psychiatry. While ade-
quately defining mental disorder is a notoriously thorny
issue with far reaching implications for psychiatric
research, diagnosis, socio-political interventions, at least
since the publication of the DSM-III there has been a
consensus of the fact that a convincing definition of
mental disorder is required. In addition, for many, the
credibility of psychiatry as a medical discipline to a cer-
tain extent depends on a convincing definition. On the
background of the socio-political developments that the
American Psychiatric Association (A.P.A.) faced during
the 1970s the effort in the DSM-III and DSM-IV to
define mental disorder becomes more transparent [3,4].
First, proponents of the “anti-psychiatry” were radically
questioning the scientific legitimacy of psychiatry: Scep-
tics like Szasz [5] were arguing that psychiatry, rather
than being a genuine branch of medicine, is a masked
form in which social power is exercised. Simply, the
exercise of power works through a medicalisation of
‘problems in living’ that - following Szasz - are really
non-medical in nature. Second, the classification of
homosexuality as a mental disorder, as proposed by the
DSM-II, became increasingly untenable. Third, support
groups have worked for the recognition of mental disor-
ders as a disease like others (diseases of the brain) to
lessen stigmatisation and to secure the same benefits to
the mentally ill as to the physically ill.
Against the background of these issues that psychiatry
was struggling with, it is comprehensible that only a
value-free definition of mental disorder seemed really
acceptable. The idea is that if mental disorder could be
defined relying solely on ‘pure’ facts free of value judg-
ments then psychiatry would no longer be vulnerable to
anti-psychiatric attacks. There are of course varieties of
such ‘naturalism’ about defining mental disorder. First,
in the framework for studying mental disorder known
variously as the ‘biomedical’,o r‘disease’ model, mental
disorder is often understood as a ‘natural kind’ Zachar
[6,7]. I have elsewhere dealt with the pros and cons of
such a view (X forthcoming), and in this paper, I will
consider a second version of such naturalism, which I
suggest we term natural function objectivism.P r o p o -
nents of this view hold that while evaluation does trigger
research interest, but that after this preliminary evalua-
tion the further study into the condition can be done
objectively, without the involvement value-laden
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tant to settle the issue whether something is dysfunc-
tional. Rather, in order to objectively identify a
particular condition as a disorder, proponents of this
approach make recourse to the notion of natural func-
tion.A sIs e ei t ,natural function objectivism comes in
two varieties depending on the way the ‘naturalness’ of
natural functions is understood. Guided by this distinc-
tion, the paper falls into two parts, dealing with the
work of two authors that are generally agreed on as
the most prominent proponents of each view [1]. In
the first part of the paper, I will explore Christopher
Boorse’s ‘biostatistical’ account of natural function that
builds on a combination of biological function and sta-
tistical normality (1). In the second part, I will investi-
gate the merits of the ‘hybrid naturalism’ approach to
natural functions, originally developed by Jerome
Wakefield. This account is hybrid because it both
accepts a value component (harm), while still embra-
cing an objective, evolutionary account of natural func-
tions. The objectivist dimension in this account is that
psychological sub-systems that constitute a human
being were naturally selected to perform certain func-
tions and that such natural functions are objectively
discoverable (2). The goal of the first part will be to
critically assess the arguments supporting the idea that
we should conceptualise psychiatric disorders in
recourse to such accounts of natural functions. To
anticipate a central point, I will argue that due to deci-
sive difficulties of such natural function accounts they
fail to provide the backdrop for a reliable definition of
mental disorder. Then, in the third and last part of the
paper I will argue that the seemingly unsolvable classi-
ficatory problems have led to two proposals that to an
extent might be understood as echoing a certain resig-
nation. One argues that we should give up the idea of
a strict definition of mental disorder, because it is
impossible to provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for membership in the category ‘mental disorder.’
Another proposes that we should re-map definitions
depending on psychopharmacological effects. I will
counter these strategies and argue for the possibility of
a definition (3).
As mentioned, within the framework of the develop-
ment the DSM-V, researchers have once more directed
focus on the concept of mental disorder. A crucial issue
in this discussion is whether the concept of dysfunction,
which emerges out of the naturalistic approaches that I
deal with in this paper, should be retained in the DSM-
V. There is considerable disagreement on this issue [1,8]
and a clarification is needed. While not providing a defi-
nition, I expect that the findings of this paper will con-
tribute to the advancement the debate towards a more
valid and philosophically robust definition.
1. Biostatistics: Biological Function and Statistical
Normality
Scadding [9] has influentially defined disease as “the
sum of the abnormal phenomena displayed by a group
of living organisms in association with a specified com-
mon characteristic or set of characteristics by which
they differ from the norm for their species in such a
way as to place them at a biological disadvantage.”
Recently, in their widely used book Models for Mental
Disorder. Conceptual Models in Psychiatry, Tyrer &
Steinberg [[10], p. 8) embrace this definition, holding
that it is equally suited to help define both physical and
mental disorder. The authors remark such a statistics-
based definition of mental disorder would harbour deci-
sive advantages: it is held that such a model does not
have to involve value judgments in order to define men-
tal disorder, and therefore one of the gravest problems
of a definition could be solved. Additionally, it is argued
that such a definition might set limits to what critics
have called the growing medicalisation of ‘problems in
living’. This is, because in order for something to qualify
as a disorder, it has to be both statistically deviant and
biologically disadvantageous. This limiting aspect
ensures that conditions such as ‘late luteal dysphoric
disorder’ (premenstrual tension) would not count as
genuine disorders. While such a condition might deviate
from the norm, in this view it cannot qualify as a dis-
ease, because it cannot be shown to be directly disad-
vantageous. So due to the fact that it is only a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for a disorder to differ
from the statistical norm, Tyrer & Steinberg are confi-
dent that such a definition is immune to accusations
that psychiatry treats ‘problems in living’.A st h e yn o t e
“The disease model in psychiatry helps to decide which
of these conditions is beyond its scope and unsuitable
for mental health interventions” [ [ 1 0 ] ,p .8 ] .A l o n gt h e
same lines of thought, Kendell [11] has embraced a
comparable biostatistics-informed notion of disease,
arguing that manic depression and schizophrenia can
legitimately be classified as diseases because sufferers
can be shown to have a biological disadvantage: they
live shorter lives and have fewer children than the rest
of the population. However, as Cooper [4] points out,
the claim that disorders are conditions that reduce life
expectancy or fertility are untenable. These are neither
necessary nor sufficient conditions for a disease. Being a
professional mercenary is statistically infrequent and
most likely reduces life expectancies, but this does not
warrant the label disorder. It is equally implausible to
claim a necessary link between health and fertility.
Christopher Boorse has proposed a more complex and
influential biostatistical account of disease that provides
a solution to some of these problems. Although often
Boorse discusses physical disorders, he also explicitly
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Boorse holds that the definition of metal disorder and
psychiatric classification in general can indeed be scien-
tific and objective, because it is possible to detect a dis-
order solely by bio-statistical means and without any
recourse to value judgements. He argues that the value-
neutrality of a classification can be maintained if a defi-
nition of mental disorder is informed by our knowledge
of biological design: “If diseases are deviations from the
species biological design, their recognition is a matter of
natural science, not evaluative decision” [[13], p. 543].
He has recently re-confirmed his position, maintaining
that “disease is only statistically species-subnormal bio-
logical part-function; therefore, the classification of
human states as healthy or diseased in an objective mat-
ter, to be read off the biological facts of nature without
need for value judgments” [[12], p. 4]. Just as in Tyrer &
Steinberg [10] and Scadding [9], Boorse’s biostatistical
theory “rests on the concepts of biological function and
statistical normality” [ [ 1 2 ] ,p .4 ] .T h u s ,j u s ta si nT y r e r
& Steinberg and Scadding, Boorse defends a naturalist
position and maintains that value-judgments can be
omitted if one focuses on the ‘natural fact’ that underlies
a mental disorder.
Boorse’s Bio Statistical Theory (BST), equates health
with normal species functioning, which is the statisti-
cally typical contribution of a sub-system to the organ-
ism’s overall goals: survival and reproduction. The group
with respect to which a contribution is statistically typi-
cal is the reference class,ag r o u pm a d eu po fa l lt h e
individuals belonging to the same age group, sex and
race of an individual [13]. Compared to the accounts of
Tyrer & Steinberg and Scadding, the introduction of a
reference class is one of the genuine achievements of
Boorse. At the same time the idea of reference class
provides a solution to the problems that Tyrer & Stein-
berg and Scadding ran into. So a person is healthy if all
the sub-systems that constitute him function in ways
that are statistically typical for the reference class of the
person that entails race, age and gender. Boorse main-
tains that reference classes are needed due to the vast
variety of functioning. In many cases, it is impossible to
identify variables that are statistically typical for the
entire species. For example, the same hormonal levels
could mean both health and disease depending on the
age and gender of the person. But on the other hand,
the reference classes cannot go below a certain size: if
the reference group for healthy liver functioning is made
up of men with a high alcohol consumption, then liver
functioning indicators that we normally would consider
as diseased, would appear as within a statistically normal
range. In other words, it seems that the BST hinges on
an account of the kind of reference classes: disease is
not to deviate from any, but the ‘appropriate’ reference
classes only. Therefore, Boorse must justify his choice of
reference classes and show that the distinction between
appropriate and inappropriate reference classes rest on
neutral, empirical facts. In the work of Boorse, this
question of justification is solved in the following man-
ner: the appropriate reference class is simply conceptua-
lised as “a natural class of organisms of uniform
functional design” [[13], p. 562]. In other words, for
Boorse, the reference class rests on neutral, natural
facts. The term ‘functional design’ might evoke the
thought that Boorse is attempting to justify his reference
c l a s s e sb yr e c o u r s et oe v o l u t i o n a r yb i o l o g y .H o w e v e r ,
Boorse explicitly rejects such a strategy of justification
[14,15]. While Boorse’s account certainly has some mer-
its compared to the ones proposed by Tyrer & Steinberg
and Scadding, in the following I will argue that Boorse’s
solution harbours three problems, pertaining to issues of
reference class (a), circularity (b) and value (c).
a) Reference Class
As I have noted, since the label ‘disorder’ is only war-
ranted by the deviation from ‘appropriate’ reference
classes, the account hinges on whether Boorse is able to
give appropriate justification for his conceptualisation of
the ‘appropriate’ reference classes. It is not difficult to
s e et h a ti ti sl a s t l yt h er e f e r e n c ec l a s st h a td e t e r m i n e s
the boundary between disease and health. And here,
some problems arise: if a definition of disorder is not to
make recourse to evaluative judgment, Boorse has to
show that the distinction between appropriate and inap-
propriate reference classes rest on neutral, empirical
facts. In the work of Boorse, this question of justification
is solved in the following manner: the appropriate refer-
ence class is simply conceptualised as “a natural class of
organisms of uniform functional design” [[13], p. 562].
In other words, for Boorse, the reference class rests on
neutral, natural facts. But obviously, ‘natural’ here can-
not be taken to refer to whatever occurs in nature,
because obviously both appropriate and inappropriate
ones occur in nature. Rather than just ‘occurring in nat-
ure’, the criteria of defining appropriate reference classes
are mixed: some characteristics that define appropriate
r e f e r e n c ec l a s s e sa r ei n n a t e( l i k es e xa n dr a c e ) ,w h i l e
o t h e r s( l i k ea g e )a r ec l e a r l ya c q u i r e d .S ot h eq u e s t i o n
arises: if ‘natural’ is not taken to refer to whatever
occurs in nature, what then justifies the ‘appropriate-
ness’ of Boorse’s reference classes? As I see it, although
Boorse’s account hinges on a justification of appropriate
reference classes, he nevertheless fails to provide such
justification. Due to this lack, the problem that remains
is quite striking. For instance, if I describe myself as
Caucasian, blue-eyed and tall, in Boorse’s account no
empirical facts that determine that only ‘Caucasian’
would count as the appropriate reference class. In sum-
mary, Boorse fails to provide an objective justification
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objective justification for his concept of disorder.
b) Circularity
In an important manner the BST is vulnerable to
charges of circularity. The goal for Boorse is to distin-
guish healthy from diseased functioning by appealing to
a standard of normality. We should keep in mind that
Boorse aims to explain normality in terms of the design
o ft h eo r g a n i s m :T h en o r m a li s“to be defined as that
which functions in accordance with its design.” In his
non-evolutionary framework the criteria for determining
what something’s design or function is that it has to
make “a standard causal contribution to a goal actually
pursued by the organism.” These goals can be identified
empirically, (statistically) “without considering the value
of pursuing them”. In other words, studying the statisti-
cally normal behaviour of the organism can identify the
goals of the organism. Now it seems that Boorse has
moved in a circle, since statistic normality is being
employed to define functioning according to design,
which then is used to elucidate the notion of normal
[16]. So it seems that the two central terms for Boorse
are explained by reference to each other. Somewhat sim-
plified the two claims are this:
1) Whether X is a function is determined by
whether X is normal behaviour
2) Whether X is a normal behaviour is determined
by whether X is a function
In the first case, Boorse claims that in order to iden-
tify X as a function, it needs to be established that X is
a normal behaviour. At the same time, according to the
second claim, normal behaviour is determined by func-
tion. So the problem of circularity arises when function
(qua causal contribution to a goal) is determined by
normal behaviour, and at the same time normal beha-
viour is determined by function. Instead of referring to
each other and to live up to Boorse’s claims, the two
concepts must be explained independently.
c) Value-ladeness
According to Boorse, one of the main advantages of the
BST would be that it could provide a value-free definition
of disease. But let us again raise the issue of homosexual-
ity. Then, the BST should be able to tell us whether such a
condition qualifies as a disorder. As Cooper [[4], p.17]
rightly notes, someone who endorses Boorse’s account is
forced to accept that homosexuality might be a disorder.
Boorse has more recently accepted this result, but defends
his account by saying that a determination of a condition
a sad i s e a s ed o e sn o ti m p l yt h a ti ts h o u l db et r e a t e db y
health professionals [[12], pp. 11-12]. But in this case, the
price is that the account of disease is deflated, and quite
far from our normal use of the concept of disease, which
includes that a disease is actually a bad thing to have. On
the other hand, as previously mentioned, the question
whether homosexuality is a disease can be reduced to the
question whether sexual orientation should count as an
appropriate reference class. If sexual orientation counts as
an appropriate reference class, then homosexuality is not a
disease, whereas if sexual orientation does not qualify as
an appropriate reference class, homosexuality is a disease.
But as we have seen, the issue of appropriate reference
classes cannot be solved by drawing on empirical facts: the
judgment about what should count as an appropriate
reference class precedes the empirical realm. And since no
empirical fact can be deployed to identify whether sexual
orientation should not qualify as an appropriate reference
class, no empirical fact can determines whether homo-
sexuality is a disease.
To conclude, Boorse’s connection of abnormal func-
tion to statistical deviance is problematic. The crucial
issue of how to define natural function is not adequately
solved. How is natural, species-typical functioning to be
grasped that is adequate to the organism’s age and con-
tributes to survival and reproduction? Maybe therefore,
in order to build a stronger account of function, in his
reply to criticism he attempts to include evolutionary
explanations of function in account, which is clearly
inconsistent with his rejection of evolutionary terms
[[15], p. 135]. Now, statistically normal functioning in a
species is understood as a marker of the evolutionary
design. With this move Boorse shifts the terrain, since
now the question is how to define function in evolution-
ary terms, thus how to determine whether a conditions
assists or obstructs the continuance of the species.
While I shall address this approach in the following, let
me already mention that such a solution is deemed to
fail: evolutionary dysfunction is neither necessary nor
sufficient for something to be a disease.
An influential account that deploys a notion of natural
function informed by evolutionary theory has been pro-
p o s e db yJ e r o m eW a k e f i e l d .I nt h en e x ts e c t i o nIw i l l
deal with such an evolutionary-based account of func-
tion and while exploring this position, I will attempt to
exemplify the consequences of evolutionary approaches
function to depression.
2. “Hybrid” Naturalism
In a series of influential papers, Wakefield has persua-
sively maintained that a condition should count as a dis-
order if and only if it is a harmful dysfunction. In other
words harm to the individual is a necessary condition for
ad i s o r d e r :ac o n d i t i o nc a n n o tb eam e n t a ld i s o r d e r
unless this condition “causes some harm or deprivation
of benefit to the person as judged by the standards of
the person’sc u l t u r e ” [[17], p. 385]. In contrast to
Boorse, besides incorporating a factual component
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tant value component (harm). With this move Wake-
field creates a “hybrid” definition that tries to bridge the
gap between the previously incompatible positions: the
“social-constructivist” position that understood mental
disorder as a value-laden social construct and the posi-
tion that defined mental disorders as natural entities to
be understood in biological terms [18].
“I have proposed a hybrid account, the “harmful dys-
function” (HD) analysis of the concept of mental dis-
order. According to the HD analysis, a disorder is a
harmful dysfunction, where “harmful” is a value
term, referring to conditions judged negative by
sociocultural standards, and “dysfunction” is a scien-
tific factual term.” [[19], p. 149]
“A condition is a disorder if and only if (a) the condi-
tion causes some harm or deprivation of benefit to
the person as judged by the standards of the person’s
culture (the value criterion), and (b) the condition
results from the inability of some internal mechanism
to perform its natural function, wherein a natural
function is an effect that is part of the evolutionary
explanation of the existence and structure of the
mechanism (the explanatory criterion)” [[17], p. 384].
So the claim of a factual malfunctioning of an inter-
nal mechanism that causes objective dysfunction is
paired with the claim the social definition of “harm”
depends on the cultural context. What I would like to
emphasise in this context is within the hybrid con-
struction, Wakefield nevertheless remains objectivist
about natural function. The underling claim is twofold:
first, psychological sub-systems that constitute a
human being were naturally selected to perform cer-
tain functions, Second, such natural functions are
objectively discoverable. In this manner, he embraces
an evolutionary account to define dysfunctions as “fail-
ures of internal mechanisms to perform the functions
for which they were naturally selected.” Recently [[19],
p.149] Wakefield has restated his point adding that “in
modern science, “dysfunction” is ultimately anchored
in evolutionary biology and refers to failure of an
internal mechanism to perform one of its naturally
selected functions.” So while he accepts that for a con-
dition to be a disorder it is necessary that the dysfunc-
tion is harmful, he claims that there has to be an
evolutionary dysfunction in order to qualify as a disor-
der. Incorporating both value and scientific criteria,
Wakefield’s hybrid account is an attractive alternative,
but nevertheless, in the following I will point out three
problems with his version of naturalism about natural
function, pertaining to statistical norm (a), evolutionary
mismatch (b) and adaptively neutral exaptations (c).
a) Statistical norm
In a sense, Wakefield runs into the problem that
haunted Boorse’s account. Like Boorse, Wakefield
accepts a dimensional view of disorder, in which dys-
function is not a categorical break, but a graded devia-
tion. The backdrop against which such a deviation can
be identified is in Wakefield’s case an evolutionarily
designed natural function. But then, the same question
that haunted Boorse’s account also inescapably pops up
here: how can a non value-laden dimensional boundary
between function and dysfunction be created? In princi-
ple just like Boorse, Wakefield must also identify the
evolutionarily designed response to the environment via
recourse to a statistical norm: thus, the designed
response is identical to what is exhibited by the majority
of the population. There are two problems with this
move. First, as Lilienfeld & Marino [20] have noted,
such an approach does not take into account that nat-
ural selection often produces substantial variability
across individuals. Second, when attempting to distin-
guish genuine disorders from normal responses, at least
sometimes Wakefield makes recourse not to evolution-
ary psychological theory, but to an estimation about
appropriate response. Let me try to demonstrate what
this amounts to. In the case of depression, among the
DSM-IV criteria for major depressive disorder there is
an exclusion for uncomplicated bereavement: following
loss of a loved one, up to two months of depressive
symptoms are regarded as normal. In Wakefield’s
account [21], such a reaction might be a designed
response since it represents a reaction that is exhibited
by the majority of the population. This is not to suggest
that Wakefield subscribes to the DSM IV criteria for
Major Depressive Disorder. In fact, Horwitz and Wake-
field [18] argue at length that the DSM IV criteria are
too inclusive, resulting in the ‘Loss of Sadness’.B u ta l l
things considered, the evolutionarily designed response
to the environment is found via recourse to a statistical
norm. To be clear, I am not denying that a certain
depression-like reaction might be a designed response.
Also, it might be the case that such designed responses
can be identified by statistical means. However, what I
wish to emphasise here, is that there is no objective
standard to determine whether “up to two months”
represents an evolved response to environmental stress.
What adds to the implausibility of such a way of reason-
ing is the well-known fact that adaptive responses differ
across individuals.
b) Mismatch explanations
One of Wakefield’s important assertions, namely that
important mental and physical systems were most likely
designed by evolution to perform a given function, is
highly problematic. At least a number of systems cannot
be adequately conceived of as selected, fitness-increased
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in two kinds. First, there are ‘exaptations’ that are sec-
ondary adaptations: the feather system of birds is a
good example here. It is widely held that the feather
system originally evolved to enable heat regulation in
birds, while it was only in a secondary process that it
became an instrument for flight. So such secondary
exaptations have enhanced fitness at the point of their
emergence, but might have since taken on fitness-
increasing functions that are dissimilar from their origi-
nal functions. Given the definition of dysfunction as the
failure to fulfil originally designed function, Wakefield’s
account cannot explain secondary adaptations. A broken
wing of a bird might still fulfil its original function as a
heat regulator. Surely, if one modified the account so
that it only refers to current design, then it could
accommodate secondary adaptations. But, as Lilienfeld
& Marino [20] have shown this would lead to other
unsolvable problems.
Let us see what the consequences of Wakefield’s
account would amount to in the case of depression. For
many, since depression is suitably prevalent through his-
tory it is seen to be appropriate to investigations of its
evolutionary origins. But first, it is useful to point out a
helpful taxonomy of evolutionary explanations by Mur-
phy [22] that distinguishes between three types of evolu-
tionary explanation of psychopathology. A breakdown
explanation understands mental disease as the malfunc-
tion of some component of the mind/brain in fulfilling
its evolutionary function. A mismatch explanation
understands mental disease as connected to a mechan-
ism that was once adaptive but is no longer adaptive
because of changes in the environment. So the pathol-
ogy lies not in some sub-system of an individual, but in
the mismatch between the ancestral environment and
our current environment. A more controversial persis-
tence explanation holds that some putative disorders
qualify as adaptive even in the present environment. So
far, such evolutionary-informed investigations into
depression have tended to follow two opposing paths:
mismatch explanation and persistence explanations.
Both build on the idea that those mechanisms or devices
activated in depression evolved to manage hostile situa-
tions in which flight was impossible. From here, the two
accounts part ways: The so-called “dysregulation”
model, defended by Nesse [23] and Gilbert and Allan
[24], hypothesises that in depression this inherited
mechanism becomes pathologically over-activated. One
seriously inhibiting aspect about the dysregulation
model is that it does not address the individual and
social factors, and thus does not address why some
rather than others are affected.
What I wish to point out here is that the mismatch
explanation of depression, if true, would challenge
Wakefield’s position. Price et al. [25] and Nesse and
Williams [26] argue that depression should be under-
stood as an evolved, adaptive response to specific pro-
blems that arise in the small, status-oriented social
groups of our ancestors. So if depression can be under-
stood as adaptive, it is not to the natural, but to the
social environment. Gilbert [27] notes that it is not a
loss of control over the environment that is particularly
depressing, but the loss of control in the social environ-
ment. More specifically, depression is an adaptive
response to the loss of status in such small social
groups, that helps to accept lowered rank once having
lost status [25,28]. Once out-competed, it is of advan-
tage to self-evaluate, ruminate upon weaknesses and
alter previous behaviours. T h ei d e ai st h a td e p r e s s e d
mood helps to accept status loss and motivates the per-
son to alter previous behaviours in order to ameliorate
reproductive chances. The suggestion is that while in
such small groups this adaptive response might have
been a fruitful strategy resulting in social success, in
contemporary and much more sizeable groups, this
strategy is a mismatch. Due to a radically changed social
setting the inherited mechanism - activated when one
thinks that he is out-competed - is no longer adaptive,
since it will be activated frequently in the modern
world, as our peer group with whom we compete is tre-
mendously larger. Such a mechanism will not only fail
to accomplish the goal it was selected to achieve: given
modern societal framework, the depressed affect-lower-
ing response to change is not only ineffective but also
seriously inhibiting and fitness decreasing. Nesse [29]
takes this mismatch to explain at least to a certain
extent the alleged worldwide rise of depression.
The mismatch explanation of depression challenges
Wakefield’s account, because it shows that the depres-
sive responses can be seen as the results of systems per-
forming their originally evolved functions, but in a
mismatched context. If one is to incorporate such mis-
matched responses, then the problem that Boorse’s
account could not solve re-emerges: we would need to
specify what level of depressive reaction should count as
appropriate or inappropriate to be regarded as dysfunc-
tional. As previously noted, there are no unambiguous
ways of doing this, since there is no non-situational and
value-free boundary separating dysfunction from normal
functioning.
c) Adaptively neutral exaptations
Additionally, there are also adaptively neutral exapta-
tions [20], non-selected features that are merely by-pro-
ducts of adaptations that have not enhanced fitness at
the point of their emergence. Gould [30] has argued
that the large size if the brain, the most complex and
flexible organ, originally arose as an adaptation for some
functions in humans’ ancestral past, and the sheer
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human brain “throws up spandrels by the thousands for
each conceivable adaptation in its initial evolutionary
restructuring” [[30] p.58]. Good examples of such adap-
tively neutral exaptations that are unlikely to be of
direct relevance to increase fitness are on Gould’s
account psychological capacities like religion, reading,
writing, fine arts, the norms of commerce, arithmetic
ability, music, or motor skills. More precisely, it has
since been argued that these exaptations might be indir-
ect, domain-general consequences of natural selection,
like general intelligence [31,32]. Accommodating such
exaptations is a problematic issue for Wakefield’s
account. For example people with congenital amusia,
which is an established learning disability for music, a
deficit that appears highly specific to the musical
domain [33]. Afflicted people are unable to discriminate
the pitch of two successive tones, to recognise familiar
melodies or to remember a tune. Now, on Wakefield’s
account, since the impaired function is not the outcome
of evolution, amusia would not count as a disorder.
All in all, it seems that dysfunction in evolutionary
terms is simply neither necessary nor sufficient for dis-
order. Wakefield’s account cannot accommodate adap-
tively neutral exaptations and mismatches (mechanisms
once adaptive, but no longer adequate due to environ-
mental changes). The upshot of this discussion is that in
general, it is not the case that a disease must involve
evolutionary dysfunction. If one is to hold on to an evo-
lution-informed account of dysfunction and mental dis-
ease, one must identify the characteristic selection
pressures of the time period when a certain function is
taken to be adaptive. As we have seen, the same condi-
tion might be a function (in a time with certain social
constellations responding to selection pressures) and at
a later point a mismatched dysfunction.
So to conclude, this third part of the paper was
devoted to the hybrid naturalism approach to defining
mental disorder, that both accept a value component
(harm) and embrace an objective, evolutionary-informed
account of natural functions. Central to such a hybrid
objectivist approach is the idea that the natural function
of psychological sub-systems is determined by natural
selection and that such natural functions are objectively
discoverable. One might argue that Wakefield only says
that whether something is a natural function is a factual
matter. As he argues in “Metal Disorder as a Back Box
Essentialist Concept”, natural functions might be hidden
in the ‘black box’. However, even though the ‘black box’
idea might give rise to such an interpretation, Wakefield
is in the same paper actually quite unequivocal that nat-
ural functions are objectively discoverable. As he notes:
“Evolutionary theory (...) explains biological design and
thus shows that disorder refers to a scientifically
identifiable phenomenon” [[34] p. 465]. An important
conclusion of this part was that dysfunction in evolu-
tionary terms is simply neither necessary nor sufficient
for something to be a disorder. Due to the severity of
these problems, we have good reasons to reject this par-
ticular approach to defining mental disorder. Although
the idea of a purely objective definition of mental dis-
ease appears attractive to many psychiatrists, the
approaches explored in this paper fail to bring about
such a definition.
3. Other strategies: Roschian concepts and
psychopharmacological taxonomy
Perhaps also as a reaction to the debate about classifica-
tion and to the severe problems with such ‘objectivist’
definitions of mental disorder, two proposals have
emerged that radically call into question the whole effort
of defining of metal disorder. In a sense, these proposals
to a certain extent echo a resignation. The first account
I wish to explore at this point draws on the idea of
‘Roschian concepts’ t oa r g u et h a ti ti si np r i n c i p l e
impossible to provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for membership in the category ‘mental disorder’ (a).
The second account that I will address suggests that
instead of conceptual philosophical and conceptual
issues, a definition of mental disorders should be based
on psychopharmacology. Roughly, the underlying idea is
that a mental disorder is a condition that psychophar-
macological products have alleviating effects on (b). In
the following, I will argue that both of these strategies
have crucial flaws and that they do not provide convin-
cing reasons to reject the possibility of a good definition
of mental disorder.
a) Roschian concepts
Scott Lilienfeld and Lori Marino [20] have suggested
that the failure of a good definition is not a practical,
but a principal problem. The authors claim that ‘mental
disorder’ is a ‘Roschian concept’, characterised by the
fact that it is in principle impossible to provide neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for category membership.
In a same way Mackinejad and Sharifi [35] have pro-
posed a view of mental disorder as a Wittgensteinian
family resemblance concept. Wittgenstein maintained
that no necessary and sufficient conditions can be given
for something which is a game. Rather, akin to members
of a family, games are held together by a set of similari-
ties, in a way that while all members of the family will
not share the same feature, any two members will be
similar in at least one way. Instead, Scott Lilienfeld and
Lori Marino [20] propose that for a condition to qualify
as a mental disorder hinges on grades of similarity to
prototypical cases. While one cannot in general deter-
mine necessary and sufficient conditions, conditions
resembling these prototypical cases should qualify as
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set of necessary and sufficient properties, but global
similarity to a prototype determines membership. While
this strategy may at first sight avoid a whole range of
problematic issues, it is in itself problematic, because, as
Fulford [[36] p. 419] notes, it ducks major issues by opt-
ing out. Another issue is that Lilienfeld and Marino [20]
do not distinguish between Roschian and vague con-
cepts. Many of our concepts are vague, without firm
boundaries. There is always the possibility that a bound-
ary of a concept is vague because we are ignorant of
underlying factors, which, if known, would provide a
precise boundary. Additionally, it might very well be
that the necessary and sufficient conditions are also
vague [[37] p. 378]. Importantly, the vagueness of a con-
cept does not warrant the conclusion that it is of
Roschian structure and that necessary and sufficient
conditions for category membership cannot be provided.
Drawing on Wakefield [37] we could use the concept
‘bachelor’ to contrast vague and Roschian concepts. The
concept ‘bachelor’ is vague: necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for group membership can be given (unmarried,
a d u l ta n dm a l e ) ,b u tt h e ya r ev a g u e ,s i n c ei ti s ,f o r
example, unclear at exactly what age a boy counts as a
m a n .T h es a m el i n eo ft h o u g h ta l s oa p p l i e st o‘mental
disorder’. Thus, the vague boundaries of a concept like
mental disorder cannot by itself count as evidence
against the possibility of there being necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for category membership.
b) Psychopharmacological taxonomy
With the rise and rapid development of psychopharma-
cology, an alternative causal approach to psychiatric
classifications emerged that aims at remapping psychia-
tric categories, depending on psychopharmacological
effects. Such a view became known through the work of
Peter Kramer on depression and Prozac [38]. Instead of
merely treating patients, Kramer suggests that Prozac
should be used as diagnostic tool. The underlying idea
of such an approach is as follows: if fluoxetine success-
fully alleviates the symptoms of patients suffering from
obsessive-compulsive disorder, anxiety disorders, depres-
sion, or premenstrual dysphoric disorders and distress,
then the conclusion is warranted that each of these dis-
eases have a common underlying cause. With psycho-
pharmacological products as tools, Kramer suggests that
we redraw the taxonomic map, providing the possibility
of reconsidering connections between currently distinct
mental disorders. In regard to the topic of this paper,
one might object that psychopharmacological taxonomy
is not pertinent. The objection could maintain that this
taxonomic approach is only used for the categorisation
of mental disorders and not such much in order to
define ‘mental disorder’. However, the idea that a mental
disorder is a condition that psychopharmacological
products have an alleviating effect on, underlies the psy-
chopharmacological taxonomy approach. But just how
consistent is this?
The first objection points to one the most severe pro-
blem of such an approach. Simply, the psychopharmaco-
logical approach cannot be of help in defining mental
disorder: the fact that a psychopharmacological product
has an alleviating effect on a mental condition does not
justify the conclusion that the condition that the drug
alleviates is a mental disorder. For instance, it is often
the case that anti-depressive drugs alleviate particular
forms of sub-threshold anxiety. Yet, this empirical con-
clusion does not directly translate into an ontological
one. In other words, it does not say anything about
whether the specific from of anxiety was a mental disor-
der or not. Second, another objection concerns the issue
of reliability. Wallace [39] has noted that even most
physiologically based diseases like infectious diseases,
such a psychopharmacological approach would fail for
at least two reasons: first, the same infection in different
individuals does not always respond to the same medi-
cine. Second, things are additionally complicated by the
fact that distinctive infections may respond to the same
medicine. To illustrate with the case of depression, the
assumption that psychopharmacological taxonomy is
that if an anti-depressant agent is effective on a
depressed mood state then the depressed mood was
caused by whatever chemical imbalance that the anti-
depressant has proved effective on. However, as Radden
[[40], p. 40] argues this might not always be the case.
First, a depressed mood can sometimes be alleviated by
social activity or by the consumption of alcohol. This
means that in the framework of psychopharmacological
taxonomy, we would have to conclude first that the
depressed mood was caused by the lack of social activity
or simply by the lack of alcohol. Second, we would have
to say that whatever conditions are effectively alleviated
by the consumption of alcohol must belong to the same
category. On the basis of these problems, we must con-
clude that psychopharmacological taxonomy is to be
rejected on grounds of unreliability and incoherence.
Regarding to taxonomy, Zachar [[6] p. 172] suggests
that we should be “skeptical of some biological psychia-
trists’ claims that every disorder that responds to anti-
depressant medication must be a variation of the same
disorder.” We can make a related point here: if psycho-
pharmacological taxonomy cannot provide a reliable re-
definition of classification boundaries, it most likely will
not provide aid in defining mental disorder.
Conclusion
I have started out by saying that due to several socio-
political factors, to many psychiatrists only a strictly
objective definition of mental disorder, free of value
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have explored and assessed a variant of such a naturalist
approach to defining mental disorder, which I termed
natural function objectivism. Such an approach aims to
define a natural fact that underpins the definition of
mental disorder. In order to objectively identify a parti-
cular condition as a disease, proponents of this approach
make recourse to the notion of natural function. Central
to this naturalist approach is the notion of natural func-
tion and the idea that value-dependent evaluations are
not important to settle the issue whether something is
dysfunctional. In general terms, proponents of natural
function objectivism hold that while evaluation does
trigger research interest, that after this preliminary eva-
luation the further study into the condition can be done
objectively, without the involvement a value-laden judg-
ments. As I see it, natural function objectivism comes in
two varieties depending on the way the ‘naturalness’ of
natural functions is understood. Guided by this distinc-
tion, the paper first explored the Christopher Boorse’s
‘biostatistical’ account of natural function followed by an
investigation of the merits of the ‘hybrid naturalism’
approach to natural functions by Jerome Wakefield. I
have concluded that the naturalist approaches can be
divided into three categories depending on whether they
attempt to define mental disorder merely as a natural
kind, or as a biostatistical fact, an evolutionary dysfunc-
tion or adaptation have all revealed fundamental flaws.
Due to the decisive difficulties of such ‘natural function
accounts’ I argued that they fail to provide the backdrop
for a reliable definition of mental disorder. Then, I have
two proposals more or less explicitly call into question
the whole effort of defining of metal disorder. While the
first account argues that it is in principle impossible to
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for member-
ship in the category ‘mental disorder,’ the second
account suggests that a definition of mental disorders
should be based on psychopharmacology. At the end,
both accounts showed crucial flaws in providing convin-
cing reasons to reject the possibility of a good definition
of mental disorder.
At the end, it seems that a convincing, wholly natural-
ist definition of mental disorder, involving no value
judgments is impossible to find. But in what way does
this pose an insurmountable problem? We have to
remember that the pressure to find a naturalist defini-
tion emerged in a specific historical situation when psy-
chiatry was under attack. It was under these particular
circumstances that Boorse’sa n dW a k e f i e l d ’s naturalist
accounts attempted to define the domain of natural dys-
function as the proper domain of psychiatry [[41]
p. 124]. Importantly, the basic assumption of such ‘nat-
ural function objectivism’ - that was used to attempt to
resolve the fierce debates pertaining to the scientific
status of psychiatry - is that a clear separation of natural
(evolved and innate) and socially cultivated psychologi-
cal functioning is possible. However, it might be the
case that this underlying assumption of natural function
objectivism is doubtful. In general, since then, both the
socio-political situation and our scientific knowledge
have substantially changed and the changed situation
now calls for a revision of the basic dichotomy presup-
posed by both sides of the anti-psychiatry debate as well
as by the naturalist solutions to the debate. As the
socio-political background changes, it is evident that
psychiatry no longer faces the same kind of harsh criti-
cism of being a political organ. This is not to say that
psychiatry no longer faces political critique. The point is
merely that the criticism today is less uncompromising.
As to the scientific changes, new developments at the
nexus of genetics and psychology, the growing emphasis
on gene-environment interactions indicate that psycho-
logical phenotypes are neither merely evolved functions
nor are they created by environmental circumstances
(including social ones) [[41] pp. 272-276]. Rather, they
are products of complex patterns of interaction between
them. If this is the case, and current science is under-
mining the clear division between the natural (evolved)
and socio-cultural, then such basic dichotomy presup-
posed by both sides of the anti-psychiatry debate as well
as by the naturalist solutions to the debate must be
revised. As it seems, the kind of medical norm that is
relevant in psychiatry cannot be defined as a domain on
its own, apart from the social. As Kirmeyer [[42] p. 19]
rightly points out, even our very idea of ‘natural’ adapta-
tion is culturally biased: “we tend to think of adaptation
in terms of individuals rather than groups because of
the individualistic bias of Euro-American societies, and
we are less likely to recognise and give central place to
functions whose main purpose may be intragroup har-
mony rather than individual fitness.”
All in all, we need more attention to the fact that
besides being evolved, psychological functions are also
realised in specific cultural contexts and in specific indi-
viduals. Instead of attempting to abstract from these
contexts of realisation, a concept of mental disorder
must acknowledge and reflect the multiple and inter-
weaving origins of design (the genetic, the social and the
individual).
In the beginning of this paper I noted that within the
framework of the development the DSM-V, researchers
have once more directed focus on the concept of mental
disorder. There is considerable disagreement on this
issue. While some [8] argue not only to retain but also to
additionally emphasise the “dysfunction” criteria in the
DSM-V, others [1] seek for credible alternatives for this
term. Due to the problematic issues with naturalistic con-
cept of dysfunction that this paper has elaborated, I
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natives that are not directly associated with particular
theories of natural function. Both for this reason, and in
order to attempt to maintain the theory neutrality of the
DSM-V, the best alternative might be a different term
that is not directly associated with any particular theory
of function.
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